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Value Conflicts in Psychotherapy
Aaron P. Jackson, Jamie Hansen, and Juliann M. Cook-Ly
Brigham Young University
Psychotherapy has historically been viewed as value neutral; however, over the last half-century, developments have led many
scholars to conclude that we can no longer dismiss the role of values in therapy. Our position is that therapists and clients will
inevitably encounter value conflicts during the course of psychotherapy. This article postulates how such conflicts can be addressed so as to preserve and promote the integrity and well-being of both client and clinician. We review challenges to value
neutrality and summarize ethical considerations. We discuss strategies to manage values in psychotherapy and conclude by
recommending areas for consideration in professional training.

P

sychology has had a longstanding goal of developing an objective, unbiased understanding of human
beings. In the same vein, the profession’s understanding
of psychological dysfunction and treatment has been
based on a positivistic philosophy with its accompanying
empirical epistemology. Although therapists have their
own values and beliefs, they have been expected to suspend those in therapy and adopt a position of neutrality.
However, many philosophers (Gadamer, 2004; Tjeltveit,
1999) now doubt the viability of the idea that therapists
can somehow suspend their values. These scholars contend that therapist and client values are inescapable in
therapy. However, this need not impede therapy. We
will suggest that the value conflicts inherent in therapy
are important and can be utilized to promote positive
change if managed appropriately and ethically.
Ethical guidelines alone do not direct the negotiation
of delicate issues often involved in value conflicts. An example of this is the recent lawsuit filed against Eastern
Michigan University by a student who was expelled from
the school’s counseling graduate program for refusing,
on religious grounds, to counsel gay and lesbian clients
(DeSantis, 2012; see also Mintz et al., 2009). This case

highlights the need for strategies to address and manage
value differences in therapy.
This paper will provide a working definition for values
as well as a historical background of influential psychology theories and how those theories include or disregard
the role of values in therapy. Value neutrality is a dominant theme, and we will challenge that notion and emphasize the role of values in psychotherapy along with
inherent ethical considerations. We will conclude with
recommendations for professional training as a way to
manage value conflicts as they arise in therapy.
What We Mean by “Values”

In order to understand the role of values in psychotherapy, we must first understand the definitions of values
used by those in the field and the implications these definitions have for therapy. Rokeach (1973) suggests that
values, as differentiated from attitudes and interests, are the
foundational commitments upon which attitudes and inDirect correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Aaron P.
Jackson, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602. Contact
aaron_jackson@byu.edu.
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terests are based. He defines a value as “an enduring belief
that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence
is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (p. 5).
According to Beutler and Bergan (1991), “value connotes
both a prescriptive (what is good and should occur) and
a proscriptive (what is bad and should not occur) judgment regarding the target of one’s attitude” (p. 7). Similarly, Heilman and Witztum (1997) suggest that values
be viewed as “judgments (based on behavioral, cognitive,
and affective appraisals) as to what is good (what ought
to be) and what is bad (what ought to be avoided)” (p.
524). Schwartz (1992) defines values as “1) Concepts or
beliefs, which 2) pertain to desirable end-states of behaviors, that 3) transcend specific situations, 4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior” (p. 4). Jensen and Bergin
(1988) build on Rokeach’s (1973) definition by describing therapist values regarding therapy as a set of “orienting beliefs about what is good and bad for clients and
how that good can be achieved” (p. 290). In writing specifically about the role of values in counseling psychology,
Mintz et al. (2009) build on Schwartz’s (1992) definition
by adding that these “orienting beliefs about what is good
and desirable . . . guide behavior across professional counseling psychology roles and interactions” (p. 8). Thus
values can be understood as core beliefs that provide a
moral guide for human action across multiple contexts.

mirror, show them nothing but what is shown to him”
(p. 118), suggesting that it is not only possible, but also
desirable for the therapist’s personal attitudes to be kept
out of therapy.
Furthermore, Skinner (1971) felt that the behavior
modification techniques he advocated were “ethically
neutral,” saying, “There is nothing in a methodology
which determines the values governing it use” (p. 150).
For Skinner, values were superfluous to core elements of
behaviorism, as the goodness or badness of a behavior
was derived not from a moral assessment, but from the
contingencies of reinforcement. Thus, the advent of behaviorism reinforced the notion of value-free therapy.
Later humanistic psychologies broke from earlier theories by rejecting the view of the therapist as an objective,
neutral scientist, and instead held that the therapeutic
relationship with a genuine, involved counselor was essential for therapeutic change. However, this subjective
involvement did not extend to the inclusion of therapist
beliefs or values in the interactions. Instead, Carl Rogers (1951) held that therapists should “assume . . . the internal frame of reference of the client” and “lay aside all
perceptions from the external frame of reference while
doing so” (p. 29). In essence, all of the major schools of
psychological thought that existed in the middle of the
twentieth century advocated either a value-neutral approach to psychotherapy.

Historical Background

The Debate About Value Neutrality

In its early years, psychology attempted to model itself
after the natural sciences, which included adopting the
physical sciences’ methods of inquiry and emphasis on
objective, value-free theory, investigation, and practice.
Because of its apparent independence from subjective
beliefs, scientific knowledge was believed to be trustworthy, while personal values and beliefs were viewed as
hazardous to the process of inquiry. This led the field of
psychology to view psychotherapy from its inception as
a fundamentally technical enterprise in which therapists
applied scientific knowledge to client problems. Given
this view, the human experiences, values, and commitments of therapists were seen as either irrelevant or potentially harmful. For example, Freud (1912/1964) likened the work of a therapist to that of a “surgeon who
puts aside all his feelings” (p. 115) and asserted that a
therapist should “be opaque to his patients, and like a

Both theoretical writing and data-based research have
called into question the tenability of a value-free strategy
for counseling. Some scholars have begun to question the
notion of value neutrality and conceptualize therapy as
a value-laden enterprise. As Fisher-Smith (1999) states,
“Values are the bedrock upon which therapeutic decisions are made” (p. 12). Ethical concerns have also been
raised about the influence of values in therapy, and this
has led to further discussions on appropriate and ethical
value management for therapists (cf. Mintz et al., 2009).
Some have suggested that the impact of counselors’ values can still be avoided by having the counselor bracket
or suspend his or her values in therapy and by leaving the
determination of therapeutic goals to the client. Tjeltveit (2006) finds several problems with this solution. For
example, client symptoms may interfere with a client’s
ability to effectively choose therapeutic goals. In prac7
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tice, therapeutic goals are typically determined by the
therapist and client in collaboration. However, Tjeltveit
notes that even if clients are allowed to independently
choose their own therapy goals, such a practice—which
he terms liberal individualism—is still rooted in a value. By
valuing the clients’ choosing their own treatment goals,
the therapist has imposed a value and a treatment goal.
No matter who chooses the goals, the therapist has foundational beliefs about what constitutes positive mental
health for clients, which is inherently a value judgment.
We must also recognize that tolerance and respect for client autonomy are both values as well. In essence, values
underlie our very definition of healthy, normal, or welladjusted states of being and are at the core of psychological theories themselves.
Others have suggested that values can be avoided simply by implementing a given scientific method. However,
scientific methods and their underlying assumptions are
themselves based on certain values and beliefs and preclude other assumptions. The problem is aptly summarized by Slife and Williams (1995).

therapists’ ratings of improvement but not with clients’
ratings or with standardized measures of symptom improvement.
The relationship between initial value similarity and
therapeutic outcome also appears to be mixed. The types
of values on which the therapists are matched seem to
be at least as important as the degree of similarity and
dissimilarity within those values. Arizmendi, Beutler,
Shanfield, Crago, and Hagaman (1985) find that “a complex pattern of similarities and differences in specific values promote maximal improvement” (p. 16). Kelly and
Strupp (1992) find that religiously oriented values appeared to function differently than other values and suggest that religion could be investigated as a trait on which
therapists and clients are specifically matched in order to
improve outcome. Martinez (1991) finds that both clients and therapists tended to rate client improvement
higher when the therapists’ religious orientation was
more conservative theologically than the clients’ and that
the clients’ ratings of their own improvement in therapy
was correlated with initial dissimilarity in religious values. When referring to this change in values, Tjeltveit
(1986) prefers the term value conversion to value convergence because, as Schwen and Schau (1990) discovered,
counselor values tend to remain stable over the course of
therapy while client values show significantly less stability. The idea of therapists converting clients, of course,
contradicts several values traditionally held by the profession, such as respect for client autonomy, and it raises
ethical issues regarding how values should be managed.
Given that empirical data consistently demonstrates that
value conversion does in fact occur, it would be naïve to
ignore or discount the impact of values on the counseling
process.

Objectivity calls for the scientist to achieve some grounds
from which to observe that are independent of, or shielded from, all subjective influences . . .. Because subjective
influences—values, emotions—are essential to the very
identity of the scientist as a person, and because our history, culture, and so forth are often held implicitly rather than explicitly, it seems unlikely that we would ever
achieve this kind of objective ground . . .. . (p. 193)

Over the past several decades, a considerable body of
research has provided evidence that client values undergo
a shift during the course of therapy to become more like
those of the counselor, a phenomenon that has come to
be known as value convergence. This seems to occur outside the conscious intent or control of the therapist, leading Kelly (1990) to conclude that “therapists do not remain value-free even when they intend to do so” (p. 171).
Furthermore, value convergence seems to occur most
notably when there is an initial dissimilarity between
counselor and client (Kelly, 1990; Beutler, Arizmendi,
Crago, Shanfiled, & Hagaman, 1983) and has been
consistently linked with ratings of client improvement.
However, while an earlier study (Beutler, Pollack, & Jobe,
1978) shows that clients rate their global improvement
higher when they adopt their therapists’ point of view to
a greater degree, a later review article (Kelly, 1990) finds
that value convergence is significantly associated with

Ethical Considerations

Because of added attention to the issue of values in
counseling, value-neutral approaches are increasingly
seen as untenable (Bergin, Payne, & Richards, 1996) and
perhaps even undesirable. However, this raises ethical
questions for many therapists. The influence of therapist
values appears to be a threat to psychology’s core commitments of client autonomy and respect for differences
as articulated in the American Psychological Association (APA) (2002) code of ethics. Five general principles
summarize these core values, of which Principles D and
8
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E specifically address therapist “biases” (which necessarily
stem from values) as harmful elements of psychotherapy
(APA, 2002). APA’s admonition “to eliminate the effect
. . . of biases” on professional work seems to echo the traditional notion of value neutrality. The possibility that
values are affecting psychologists’ work seems to challenge the fundamental ethical concerns of protecting client rights and reducing unjust or unfair influence stemming from therapists’ beliefs and attitudes.
However, Principle A (Beneficence and Nonmaleficence) asserts that “psychologists strive to benefit those
with whom they work” and “seek to safeguard the welfare
and rights of those with whom they interact professionally” (APA, 2002). Tjeltveit (2006) argues that any argument of beneficence rests on value judgments about what
constitutes a good outcome, as opposed to a bad one, and
that psychologists may differ among themselves on what
they consider to be a good outcome. Principle A does not
clarify whose definition of beneficence takes priority or
how therapists should resolve conflicts that arise when
the goals of clients conflict with the goals of therapists.
Thus, even a principle as fundamental as beneficence is
laden with value issues that present ethical concerns.
Other ethical questions arise from the possibility of
value conversion in therapy. Tjeltveit (1986) identified
the following as possible ethical issues: the reduction of
client freedom, failure to provide clients with informed
consent, violation of the therapeutic contract, and therapist incompetence in effecting such conversation. Regarding this last issue, Vachon and Agresti (1992) stated,
“Because research has provided evidence of the therapists’
values affecting their clients’ choice of values, it is imperative that psychologists know how to work with both
their own values and the values of their clients in order to
practice ethically” (p. 510). While ethical discussions are
important in raising concerns and shaping professional
practices, it is clear that existing ethical guidelines alone
do not offer sufficient direction on how best to navigate
these delicate issues. A primary concern is how to ethically manage values in counseling to minimize the threat
of therapist values on client freedom and autonomy.

aged in therapy. We will outline several different strategies, with the understanding that much work remains to
be done in addressing this important issue.
Separating Professional Values from Personal
Values

While counselors can certainly be expected as human
beings to have personal feelings about what constitutes
desirable behavior, they can also be expected as psychology professionals to have professional beliefs about what
constitutes psychological well-being and what outcomes
are desirable for clients who are experiencing emotional
distress. The ethical threat personal belief systems pose
can be minimized if personal feelings can be distinguished from professional beliefs. This way, therapists
may still draw upon values, if only professional ones, to
guide therapy. Williams and Levitt (2007) coined the
term value atomization to describe this strategy (p. 160).
They suggest a morally relativistic stance (p. ??) in which
therapists attempt to situate themselves within their
clients’ values and guide therapy according to those values. They interviewed 14 therapists and found that they
would challenge client values only when they felt that
such values would hinder therapeutic progress or when
the clients’ values differed sharply from their own views
of positive mental health. Furthermore, some of the therapists explained that they would directly and explicitly
disclose their values to their clients in order to encourage
the clients to explore their own values.
Strupp (1980) suggested that practitioners share essential therapeutic values (professional values) as opposed
to idiosyncratic values, which are unique to the individual
therapist and can be kept out of the therapeutic encounter. For Strupp, this reduces the issue of indoctrination
and other ethical ills associated with value convergence.
Strupp held that “to the extent that the therapist’s commitment to essential therapeutic values is realized, a
number of issues that are frequently discussed in the
therapy literature become more or less irrelevant” (p.
400). These issues include gender, sexual values, religious
beliefs, and other characteristics. Tjeltveit (1986, 1999)
similarly felt that an ethical method for managing values might include a distinction between values directly
relevant to the counseling process (such as a belief that
depressive symptoms are undesirable and ought to be
reduced) and other irrelevant beliefs (including religious
and political values).

Strategies for Managing Values in Therapy

Despite a growing consensus that values are an inescapable part of psychotherapy, there is considerably less
agreement about how values should be ethically man9
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A value atomization approach assumes that a set of
professional values that are fairly consistent across practitioners can guide the process of therapy. Jensen and
Bergin (1988) explored this notion and found they could
group values into 10 themes: (1) perception and expression of feelings; (2) freedom, autonomy, and responsibility; (3) coping and work satisfaction; (4) self-awareness
and growth; (5) interpersonal and family relatedness;
(6) physical fitness; (7) mature values; (8) forgiveness;
(9) sexual regulation and fulfillment; and (10) religiosity
and spirituality. They found a high degree of consensus
among the professionals surveyed that the first 7 factors
were important for mentally healthy lifestyles, somewhat
less consensus about the importance of forgiveness, and
even less consensus about the importance of sexual regulation and religiosity. They further found that therapists’
personal characteristics and theoretical orientation influenced their views of the 10 values. Their research questions the viability of any consensus around a comprehensive core of therapist values.
Furthermore, some writers have suggested that value
atomization is neither tenable nor desirable because values are meaningfully interconnected in complex ways,
and therapists cannot be expected to tease apart which
values are mental health related and which are not (Fisher-Smith, 1999). It may be that mental health values are
interwoven with other values, including those that are
more obviously of a moral or ethical nature (Slife et al.,
2003, Slife, 2004). Tjeltveit (2006) concedes this point:
“It may in some instances be impossible to change health
values without also changing moral, religious or political
values” (p. 519). If this is the case, the central problem
of knowing how and when it is ethically appropriate for
the therapist to influence the values of the client remains
unresolved. As O’Donahue (1989) opines, “The results
of our efforts to understand and help other human beings are a function of our entire web of beliefs” (p. 1468).
Thus all of therapists’ beliefs, not just professional ones,
may be relevant to our work as therapists.

ences in values and reduce covert value convergence by
making implicit values explicit. However, Lewis (1984)
found that subjects in her study had a more negative
impression of therapists about whom they had received
value information, suggesting that clients may feel more
negatively toward counselors whose value positions are
disclosed prior to the start of therapy. Given the desire
to enhance client autonomy, some therapists may still
feel that, despite its potential negatives, self-disclosure
remains the most ethical and philosophically consistent
choice.
Fisher-Smith (1999) interviewed practicing psychologists about values management in their sessions and
found that therapists tend to adopt either a disclosure
mode (as described above) or a neutrality mode, where they
attempt to suspend or put aside their own values and beliefs in favor of those of their clients. Regardless of the
method of managing values, Fisher-Smith found that all
of the therapists interviewed share values of individualism (described as authenticity, agency, and autonomy),
and want to promote clients’ inner sense of self and their
ability to make independent decisions and manage their
own lives.
Referring Clients to Therapists with Similar Values

Tjeltveit (1986) proposed that matching clients with
counselors prior to therapy, particularly in areas such as
religion, would increase the likelihood of positive outcomes. However, Propst (1992) found that religious clients had positive outcomes with non-religious therapists
when the therapists had been trained in religious values
and religiously oriented therapeutic techniques, which
suggests that therapists’ ability to respect and understand religious values is the critical variable in outcome
rather than personal religious similarity, per se. While
matching client and counselor values may appear to have
merit, empirical literature does not demonstrate that
value similarity between client and counselor improves
treatment outcome considerably. In fact, some of the literature seems to suggest that the opposite is true, and
that dissimilarity actually predicts greater improvement
(Beutler et al., 1983; Kelly, 1990). Also, for many clients,
therapist matching may not be an option due to logistical constraints (e.g., size of practice, locale, insurance requirements, etc.).

Disclosing Personal Values

A commonly discussed alternative to either neutrality or value atomization is for therapists to be explicit
about their values and openly discuss them with clients,
whether it be prior to therapy, during therapy, or both
(Bergin, 1980, 1985; Giglio, 1993; Slife, 2004). Such selfdisclosure can be a way to open a dialogue about differ10
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Adjusting Therapeutic Goals

Our perspective on addressing the issue of value conflicts is more radical than those we have reviewed. We
see a need for a comprehensive overhaul in the way that
(a) psychotherapists are trained and (b) psychotherapy is
presented to the public.
First, we believe that therapists need to be trained to
articulate their values—both therapeutic and personal—and understand the interplay of the two. Williamson (1958), an early counseling psychologist, proposed
that all counselors should be experts at understanding
how values and morality are inherent in counseling. He
stated,

Situations may arise in which the values of the therapist and the values of the client obviously collide. After
all, if all therapist-client pairs shared identical values,
then value convergence would not present the ethical dilemma it does, and disclosure of counselor values would
be unnecessary. As such, Heilman and Witzum (1997)
suggest a value-sensitive approach to therapy because significant value conflicts can change the entire course of
therapy. The value-sensitive approach aims to protect the
larger value-grounded interests of the client, even when
doing so conflicts with typically accepted therapy goals or
the personal values of the therapist. In other words, the
therapists value the client’s values more than their own.
The result is that, at times, therapists may have to settle
for “less than a full resolution of the problem and only
deal with some of its limited symptoms” (Heilman &
Witzum, 1997, p. 524) in order to preserve clients’ value
systems. They illustrate this point with examples of therapy with clients from ultraorthodox Jewish backgrounds,
for whom pursuing goals that reflect the values of the
field, such as open acknowledgment and acceptance of
homosexual feelings, would isolate the clients from their
social and cultural groundings and may cause greater
harm overall than the original problem for which the
client sought treatment. The therapist must understand
and be sensitive to the cultural values the client brings
into therapy and, in some situations, may have to alter
the goals of therapy in order to preserve those values.

I have further argued for making explicit our own value
orientations as individual counselors, not in order that we
may adopt a counselor’s orthodox creed, but rather that
we may responsibly give societal and moral direction to
our individual work. (p. 528)

We concur and suggest that today’s pluralistic society
makes this awareness and articulation even more important. One way to begin to address this need would
be to develop an axiological taxonomy; that is, a system
for articulating therapist values. At the very least, therapists need to be trained to articulate their ontological
and philosophical assumptions and show how they relate to their theory of change, interventions, and evidence
of change. For example, therapists who identify as traditional cognitive-behavioral theorists could articulate
their value system as follows:
1. Ontology
a. the individual mind is the fundamental reality

Seeking Outside Consultation

2. Philosophical Assumptions
a. Autonomy—the mind has the capacity to change
and become more rational and more functional in
its evaluations and assessments
b. Hedonism—happiness, pleasure, and freedom
from symptoms are primary motivators
c. Universalism—there are fundamental laws or
rules of functional, effective thinking that apply
across situations and time
d. Stoicism—the ideal attitude is a reasoned restraint
in expectations and commitments, along with the
capacity to defer gratification

Williams and Levitt (2007) report that several therapists they studied would seek outside consultation or
referral when therapist values and client values were too
different. Some therapists felt that a failure to join the
clients in examining their lives from the clients’ value
system reflected an inadequate understanding or ability
on their part. In addition, Williams and Levitt observe
that the category of values that would be considered sufficiently problematic to initiate a values discussion was
very narrow for some practitioners and much broader for
others. Accordingly, their recommendation is that therapists make greater use of consultation in order to gain
perspective on such differences.

Once psychotherapists have identified a guiding ontological assumption and some fundamental philosophical
assumptions, they can more readily articulate how their
treatment goals and interventions are based in those as-
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sumptions. For example, cognitive-behavioral therapists,
making the assumptions listed above, can readily support
their use of interventions focused on changing thought
patterns to reduce symptoms of anxiety or depression.
Alternatively, psychotherapists with a relational ontology and philosophical assumptions of interdependence,
altruism, contextualism, and Christian love might focus
on the meaning and quality of a client’s relationships as
gauge of their improvement and quality of life. Clients,
once educated about the differences across the various
approaches to psychotherapy, could make more informed
choices about the psychotherapist values they might
want to engage with in therapy.

counseling, which she viewed as helping a homosexual
client engage in an immoral lifestyle (Schmidt, 2010).
Subsequent legal action led to a settlement in which the
student was paid $75,000 (Kraft, 2012).
In 2004, similar situations occurred which prompted
the training director of an APA-accredited counseling
psychology doctoral program to initiate a listserv describing the conflicts the program was encountering with
students strongly desiring not to work with LGBT clients due to religious beliefs. Other posts followed, with
more trainers expressing concern about the consequences of the conflicts between trainees’ personal values and
professional expectations (cf. Mintz et al., 2009).
The idea that trainees prefer to see clients who are
more similar to themselves has received some empirical
support (Teasdale & Hill, 2006). Several studies have
explored clients’ preferences for counselor characteristics,
but few have investigated therapists’ preferences for client
characteristics. Tryon (1986) found that therapists preferred to see clients who were young, attractive, verbal,
intelligent, and successful (YAVIS). No studies specifically investigated the preferences of therapists currently
in training until Teasdale and Hill (2006) used a paired
comparison model to examine preferences for demographic variables as well as “psychological” characteristics. Their findings suggested that students consistently
preferred to see clients with similar attitudes and values
and that psychological mindedness was the trait most
preferred in clients. They speculated that students see
clients with similar values as easier to identify and empathize with than those with different values.
When trainees refuse to work with clients with different values, training programs are presented with a problem, because the field places a high value on providing
services for underserved or marginalized populations
and respecting differences among individuals. Following the 2004 listserv, the training directors who were
involved in the discussions reached several conclusions,
namely that the general standards and codes of the field,
together with a goal to promote social justice, had to
outweigh individual trainees’ values that allowed intolerant or discriminative attitudes to affect their professional roles. They also agreed that increasingly frequent
and complex value conflicts point to a need for greater
guidance for trainers on how to manage these difficult
situations among their own trainees (Mintz et al., 2009).
Mintz et al. (2009) suggested a Counseling Psychology

More Training Considerations

Programs that train new psychologists have particular
interest in how therapists handle value differences and
the gaps between recommendations and actual practice. One of the most striking consistencies found in
the literature on values and psychotherapy is a call for
practitioners to more critically examine their own value
systems and the way these are communicated in therapy
(e.g. Mintz, et al., 2009; Slife, et al., 2003; Tjeltveit, 1986,
2006). Furthermore, therapists are not usually trained in
what Tjeltveit (1999) refers to as ethical acuity, which is
recognizing the value-laden underpinnings of therapy or
the way their own values enter into therapy. Also, therapists are not generally trained to help clients clarify their
own values, despite the recognition of the role that values
play in counseling. Vachon and Agresti (1992) state that
it is a skill to understand how the counseling process is
value laden, and it is possible to teach people this skill.
Training can help practitioners develop the necessary
skills in understanding and clarifying values that will allow them to practice ethically and competently.
Issues of value conflicts have been seen as increasingly
relevant to training programs due to actual experiences
and conflicts between trainees and programs concerning
values management. As noted earlier, Eastern Michigan
University recently terminated a graduate student from
its school psychology program because she refused to
counsel LGBT clients. The student subsequently filed a
lawsuit, which was dismissed. The ruling specified that
instead of exploring options that might allow her to
counsel homosexuals about their relationships, the student insisted that she would not engage in gay-affirming
12
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Model Training Values Statement Addressing Diversity (CPMTVSAD), which would explicate the professional values upon which students’ clinical work should
be based. While they hold that the field should not influence values that relate exclusively to nonprofessional
roles, they argue that the profession can specify expectations for professional roles, even when these expectations
are based on values that trainees themselves may not
share. To illustrate this point, they cited examples from
other fields, such as the debate currently going on about
whether pharmacists should be required to dispense
birth control pills or other medications to which they are
morally opposed.
Mintz et al. (2009) further suggest a value management strategy based on three fundamental skills: (1) understanding the philosophy that undergirds theories and
beliefs, (2) deeply examining and reconciling divergent
perspectives, and (3) recognizing and attending to transcendent values. Kelly and Strupp (1992) also noted that
it might be appropriate for training programs to include
a values sensitization component as part of training to assist
students in increasing both their awareness of their own
values and their ability to deal sensitively with the values
of clients.
Vachon and Agresti (1992) also presented a proposal
for training practitioners to clarify and manage values
during psychotherapy by becoming more aware of not
only individual and group values, but also the values that
underlie therapy interactions and psychological theories
themselves. Their recommendations include the ability
to translate counseling interactions into their implicit
value statements followed by skills in managing these
values in ways that benefit the client. They suggest that
training programs help students not only to clarify personal values, but also to understand the values underlying
theories, techniques, and interventions. They also recommend assisting students in evaluating the value-related
issues at work in various particular cases.

A number of strategies for dealing with value conflicts inherent in counseling have been proposed. These include
(a) learning to separate professional values from personal
values, (b) clarifying implicit values through therapists’
examination of their own value system, (c) disclosing
versus remaining neutral regarding therapists’ personal
values in therapy, (d) referring clients to therapists with
similar values, (e) adjusting therapeutic goals, and (f )
seeking outside consultation. We propose a somewhat
more radical approach that requires psychotherapists to
clarify and articulate their values and training programs
to teach their students to do so. Furthermore, programs
that train new therapists can provide guidance on what
is expected in terms of professional values. The proposals
discussed will hopefully serve as points of departure in
the ongoing and evolving dialogue of professional training values and expectations, with the goal of ultimately
preserving the integrity and well-being of both clients
and clinicians.

Conclusion

Beutler, L. E. (1979). Values, beliefs, religion and the persuasive influence of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 16, 432–440.
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